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outside the courtroom, "I want to go to tell them it's a lie, it's a lie, and I
want to tell them the truth."' 48 Subsequently, the defendant's motion for
a new trial was denied, and, on appeal, the decision was affirmed solely
on the basis of the rules stated above, and with but scant discussion. In
a concurring opinion, it was stated that there was a "very strong possibil-
ity" of a different verdict upon retrial, but that it did not quite reach the
stature of a "strong probability."'49
Thus was justice palpably frustrated by the rote application of a
questionable doctrine; and what should have been a substantial weapon
for good was relegated to the dung-heap of word games.150
LAWRENCE HERMAN
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
INTERSTATE ASPECTS
Two cases reached the Ohio Supreme Court on interstate enforcement
of the obligation to support a dependent. In Harris v. Sweeney,' Wis-
consin asked for extradition of an Ohio resident for failure to support
an illegitimate child located in Wisconsin. The supreme court held that
Harris was subject to extradition.
In reaching this conclusion the court correctly applied the Wisconsin
rule that a father may be criminally liable for nonsupport of an illegiti-
mate child, even though he has not been found to be the father in a
paternity action.'
148. 168 N.E.2d at 770.
149. Id. at 771. The entire concurring opinion is as follows: "While concurring with the
majority opinion, I have a strong feeling that, with the sworn recantations and re-recantations
of the minor children, and re-re-recantations of Ruth Hull, there is a very strong possibility
that there would be a different verdict, if this case were retried in the Common Pleas Court,
especially if such trial were before a jury. Perhaps even, if counsel had investigated further
before this trial, and the presentation of evidence, a different result might have been reached.
But I cannot quite bring myself to say that, as of now, a 'probability' of a different verdict
exists. Therefore I must concur with the decision here."
150. Bear in mind that the newly discovered evidence (assuming it has the desired effect)
does not automatically result in the defendant's freedom. He still must face a re-trial, and it
is merely the re-trial which is at stake. Problems of punishment and community security are
not involved. It is true that re-trials tax already crowded dockets. But this is no excuse for
injustice. Further, it is to be doubted that a relaxation of the rules stated in the text above
would result in substantial relitigation. The statute still prohibits the re-trial if the defendant
with reasonable diligence could have discovered the evidence and produced it at the first trial.
"Defendant," of course, really means "defense counsel," and the requirement of reasonable
diligence is, in effect, a punishment imposed on the accused for his failure or inability to
obtain competent counsel. The only justification for the requirement is that it prevents un-
scrupulous lawyers from withholding evidence and speculating on a verdict. However, if the
legal profession cannot deal with its "bad apples" in other ways, ways which do not punish
innocent clients, it ought to give up the label "profession."
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With regard to the matter of extradition, it is necessary, under the
usual concepts, to show that the defendant has committed a crime in the
demanding state and has then fled beyond its jurisdiction. However,
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act3 or the Uni-
form Extradition Act,4 both of which are in effect in Ohio, it is only
necessary to show that the accused "committed an act" in Ohio which
resulted in a crime in the demanding state. The court ruled that the
commission of an act includes the failure to act, and accordingly found
that a wilful failure to support a dependent in another state is a proper
basis for extradition.
In the second case, Levi v. Levi,5 the court held that where an order
is entered under the Uniform Reciprocal Support Act, no appeal is taken,
and the order is complied with over a period of years, the defendant
cannot object to the constitutionality of the Act or the order in a sub-
sequent action.
Another case dealing with the interstate aspects of domestic relations
law provides an interesting example of a familiar rule applied in an
unusual context. The statutes on commitment to a mental hospital
require that the petitioner must be either a next of kin (including
spouse) of the patient or that he must have been a resident of the county
for the preceding year. In Hamilton v. Dillon' the wife obtained a Florida
divorce with personal appearance by the husband. The Florida court
specifically found that she was a resident of Florida at the time. Seven
months later she filed an application in Ohio for the commitment of
her ex-husband, Mr. Hamilton. Her application was granted, and sub-
sequently, after he had been committed, Mr. Hamilton sought release
from the Columbus State Hospital in a habeas corpus action. The ground
for this action was that the original commitment was invalid since
Mrs. Hamilton had been neither his wife nor a resident of Ohio for one
year at the time she filed her complaint. In the author's opinion, the
court of appeals should have ruled that the statutory requirement of stand-
ing to petition for commitment is not jurisdictional, or if it is, that it is a
"disputable jurisdictional fact" to which res judicata must apply should
the question be brought up in a subsequent proceeding. The court, how-
ever, did not mention this approach, but rather found as a fact that Mrs.
1. 170 Ohio St. 151, 163 NXE.2d 762 (1959).
2. The Ohio rule is the same. See OHIo REv. CODE 5§ 3111.17, 3113.01, and State v.
Schwartz, 137 Ohio St. 371, 30 N.E.2d 551 (1940).
3. OHIo REv. CODE ch. 3115.
4. OHIo REV. CODE §5 2963.01-.27.
5. 170 Ohio St. 533, 166 N.E.2d 744 (1960). See also discussion in Conflict of Laws
section, p. 466 supra.
6. 110 Ohio App. 489, 167 N.E.2d 356 (1959). See also discussion in Conflict of Laws
section, p. 465 supra.
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Hamilton had never established a domicile in Florida and therefore did
have standing as a resident of Ohio for one year to petition for commit-
ment. The husband's writ of habeas corpus was accordingly denied.
The court held that under Williams v. North Carolina 117 the State
of Ohio is free to attack the validity of the Florida divorce and the find-
ing of Florida residence. This approach results in several interesting
consequences not mentioned by the court:
(1) The conclusion of the court was not that Mrs. Hamilton was
still Mr. Hamilton's wife, but that she had never established a residence
in Florida. However, under Florida law, domicile of the plaintiff in
Florida is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid divorce. The facts re-
lied upon by the State of Ohio to prove Mrs. Hamilton's continuing Ohio
residence also would prove that she was still his wife. Accordingly, in
a separate action against her, the state could get a decree that she was
still married to the patient and liable for his maintenance in the state
hospital.
(2) As far as the State of Ohio is concerned, Mr. Hamilton is still
married. Mrs. Hamilton was a witness, but not a party, to the habeas
corpus action. Res judicata does not apply to her, so she is single. She
can never assert any marital rights (alimony or inheritance) against Mr.
Hamilton, as her participation in the Florida divorce bars her from at-
tacking its validity.' Thus, whatever her marital status is, it seems clear
that she has marital obligations in Ohio, but no marital rights.
DIVORCE
Procedure in Divorce Cases
The Code provides that a judgment for divorce shall not be granted
on the testimony of a party unsupported by other evidence.' The re-
quirement is sometimes interpreted to mean that the evidence of a party
must be corroborated by additional evidence, with the implication that no
divorce can be granted if the party does not testify, since in such a case
the other evidence would not be "additional." This was the construc-
tion placed on the statute by the trial court in a divorce case where the
plaintiff wife was unable to testify.' ° This decision was reversed by the
court of appeals, which held that the statute applies only where the
7. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
8. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948). See also discussion in Conflict of Laws section, p. 465
supra.
9. OHIO REV. CODE § 3105.11.
10. The wife could not testify because her husband was under guardianship, and the "dead
man statute," OHIO REV. CODE 5 2317.03, provides that a party shall not testify when the
adverse party is an executor or guardian.
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party does testify, and has no application where the party does not
testify.'1
In another case, while a divorce action was pending, the trial court
entered an interlocutory order, not subject to appeal, allowing the wife
custody of certain personal property. The husband unsuccessfully ob-
jected to the trial court on the ground that the property was vital evidence
in the divorce case, and then attacked the custody order by a writ of pro-
hibition. The supreme court held that prohibition was not the appropri-
ate remedy and the husband would have to take his chances on an
appeal from the final judgment in the divorce case.
Grounds and Defenses in Divorce Cases
The case of Sevi v. Sevi'3 is interesting as an example of the wide
gap between the actions of some trial courts and the philosophy of the
appellate courts. Husband and wife were both temperamental and each
admitted to having a sharp tongue. They reviled each other and fought
throughout their married life. After thirty-eight years of this the wife
finally left her husband and sued for divorce for cruelty. The trial court
must have recognized that there was mutual cruelty and mutual condona-
tion and that it was impossible to find that after thirty-eight years of
conflict "he (or she) started it all." The court granted the wife a divorce
and with surprising candor stated for the record: "I should grant a
divorce here because these people will never live together . ..."" As
might have been expected, the court of appeals reversed, pointing out
that comparative rectitude does not exist in Ohio and that divorce is
based on fault on one side and innocence on the other.
Alimony
The case of Conner v. Conner"5 is difficult to analyze. It is not dear
whether the supreme court's opinion reflects a policy of vesting broad
discretion in the trial court on the issue of amount of alimony, or whether
the court is insisting on technical compliance with the rules of appellate
procedure. The wife was awarded a divorce and alimony consisting of
thirty-seven per cent of her husband's property. She appealed on two
grounds, the first being that the trial court abused its discretion in order-
ing alimony which was inadequate, and the second being that the
alimony decision was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The court
11. Wohlers v. Wohlers, 168 N.E.2d 608 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
12. State ex rel. Schumacher v. Victor, 171 Ohio St. 189, 168 N.E.2d 398 (1960).
13. 168 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio Cr. App. 1959).
14. Id. at 442 (concurring opinion).
15. 170 Ohio St. 85, 162 N.E.2d 852 (1959).
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of appeals reversed for abuse of discretion, without specifying in what
manner the trial court abused its discretion. On appeal to the supreme
court, the court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed
the decision of the trial court. The high court stated that while a
reversal on the weight of evidence might have been justified, the court of
appeals had not reversed on this ground, but rather on the more general
ground of abuse of discretion, without giving any legal guides for the
reconsideration of the issue by the trial court. The author is inclined to
agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice Taft 6 which indicates that
in this context the concepts of weight of evidence and abuse of discre-
tion are so closely interrelated that the supreme court should remand the
case to the court of appeals in order that that court could indicate in
what way the trial court had erred.
In Griste v. Griste7 the supreme court reaffirmed its decision of the
previous year,'8 without citing it, that a domestic relations court in an
alimony-only action has authority to order the husband to convey legal
title to his wife of property (real or personal) which was purchased with
the wife's funds but which is held in the name of the husband. Accord-
ingly, the wife is not permitted to bring a separate equity action while
the alimony case is pending.
Child Custody and Support
In Mitchell v. Mitchell9 the supreme court finally decided a question
which has resulted in conflicting decisions in the lower courts. The issue
is whether the non-custodial parent in a divorce action, who is required
to support the children, can be compelled to provide them with a college
education. Most Ohio cases, after stating the rule that the obligation
of support extends only to necessaries, have held that a college education,
unlike a high school education, is not a "necessary." Some Ohio courts
have held that the compulsory school age law fixes the age at which
education ceases to become a necessary.2" Until the present case, there
was only one Ohio case squarely holding that a college education is a
necessary for a child who has been accepted by an accredited college
and who has demonstrated that he can profit from his college training.2
16. Id. at 90, 162 N.E.2d at 855 (dissenting opinion).
17. 171 Ohio St. 160, 167 N.E.2d 924 (1960).
18. See Goetzel v. Goetzel, 169 Ohio St. 350, 159 N.E.2d 751 (1959), noted in Ross,
Domestic Relations, Survey of Ohio Law - 1959, 11 WEsT. RES. L. REV. 372, 373 (1960).
19. 170 Ohio St. 507, 166 N.E.2d 396 (1960).
20. See, e.g., Wynn v. Wynn, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 450 (Ct. App. 1928).
21. Calogeras v. Calogeras, 163 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1959). The comprehensive
opinion of Judge Woldman contains a complete discussion of the policy factors and the case
law on the issue, especially the cases from outside Ohio. The court anticipated the supreme
court decision in Mitchell by three months.
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The supreme court expressly declined to hold in Mitchell that a college
education is necessary, but did hold that the divorce court has discretion
to order a parent to provide a college education. It is unfortunate that
the court failed to provide any guide lines for the exercise of this dis-
cretion.
The Revised Code provides that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to
determine the custody of a child who is not the ward of another court.2
In Kolody v. Kolody the wife, who was separated but not divorced,
asked the juvenile court for an order of custody and support. The husband
objected that the court had jurisdiction to order custody (meaning place-
ment) but had no jurisdiction to order monetary support. In a case of
first impression, the order of the juvenile court for custody and support
money was affirmed. The court of appeals held that the term "custody"
in the statute refers to the determination and enforcement of the sum
total of all legal relations between parent and child, including the child's
right to support.
In Smith v. Smith24 the husband was ordered -to pay weekly support
for his minor child up to the time the child became eighteen. Fourteen
years after the child became eighteen the mother filed a motion to
reduce the unpaid installments to a lump sum. The court entered the
lump sum judgment, and then doubled it, by holding that interest at the
legal rate was due, not from the date of the lump sum judgment, but
from the date the child became eighteen. The case is of special interest
to delinquent husbands or fathers in view of an earlier decision involving
the same parties in which the supreme court held that neither laches nor
the statute of limitations applies to a child support decree.25
Modification or Termination of Alimony or Support
All of the cases discussed under this heading illustrate that future liti-
gation can be avoided by careful drafting of the initial decree. In Hunt
v. Hunt,2" the supreme court was faced with a separation agreement, in-
corporated in the decree, requiring the payment of monthly alimony for
an indefinite period, and containing no provision for termination or modi-
fication. The court held that the subsequent remarriage of the wife was
an election to look to her new husband for support and therefore termi-
nated the alimony obligation. In Dailey v. Dailey7 the facts were the
22. OuIo REv. CODE § 2151.23.
23. 169 N.E.2d 34 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
24. 167 NXE.2d 515 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in Equity section, p. 517
infra.
25. Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447, 156 N.E.2d 113 (1959).
26. 169 Ohio St. 276, 159 N.E.2d 430 (1959). See Ross, Domestic Relations, Survey of
Ohio Law - 1959, 11 W~sr. RES. L. REV. 372, 374 (1960).
27. 171 Ohio St. 133, 167 NY-2d 906 (1960).
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same, with one critical difference. In Dailey the alimony was a lump
sum payable in monthly installments for eleven years. The court held
that the alimony was a fixed obligation and would not terminate on the
remarriage of the wife. The decision is consistent with an earlier decision
holding that such installments continue to accrue after the death of the
husband.28
Where an alimony decree is not based on a separation agreement, and
not intended as a lump sum settlement, it is dear that the court can mod-
ify or terminate because of changed circumstances, even though the de-
cree did not contain an express reservation of jurisdiction.29 However,
the court cannot decide issues which should have been litigated at the
initial trial under the guise of modification or construction. In Krechman
v. Krechman30 the husband was ordered to pay as alimony the debts of
the parties as they existed as of the date of the decree. The court held
that the provision for payment of debts could not be modified at a sub-
sequent term of court so as to require the husband to pay all debts due
at a date prior to the initial decree.
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
Marital obligations are determined by status rather than contract. Ac-
cordingly, the Ohio Code provides that a contract between spouses who
are living together which purports to alter their legal relations is void.3 '
An antenuptial agreement is valid, 2 and the supreme court recently held
that an oral antenuptial agreement which is void under the statute of
frauds is nevertheless valid if it has been reduced to writing after the mar-
riage.33 However, any misconduct by a spouse which is a ground for di-
vorce is a breach of an implied term of the agreement, and the other
spouse may elect to treat the agreement as terminated. Thus where the
husband is divorced for his cruelty, he cannot rely on an antenuptial
agreement releasing all future property rights in order to avoid paying
alimony.34
28. DeMilo v. Watson, 166 Ohio St. 433, 143 N.E.2d 707 (1957). See Ross, Domestic
Relations, Survey of Ohio Law - 1957, 9 WEsr. RES. L REv. 314, 318 (1958).
29. Clelland v. Clelland, 166 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959). See also Olney v. Watts,
43 Ohio St. 499, 3 N.E. 354 (1885). The same rule applies to modification of child support
orders. Corbett v. Corbett, 123 Ohio St. 76, 174 N.E. 10 (1930).
30. 170 N.E.2d 91 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
31. OHIO REV. CODE § 3103.06.
32. Troha v. Sneller, 169 Ohio St. 397, 159 N.E.2d 899 (1959).
33. In re Estate of Weber, 170 Ohio St. 567, 167 N.E.2d 98 (1960). See also discussion
in Wills and Decedents' Estates section, p. 592 infra.
34. Dearbaugh v. Dearbaugh, 170 N.E.2d 262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
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Marriage
Two of the cases on the creation of the marital status were criminal
cases. In State v. Schreckengost 5 the court held that a bigamous mar-
riage contracted outside of Ohio was not a violation of the Ohio bigamy
statute,"8 which is clearly phrased in terms of the act of marriage rather
than cohabitation.
In State v. Weitzel"7 the defendant was charged with burglary and
larceny. The defense was that the victim was the defendant's common-
law wife. The trial court determined as a matter of law that no mar-
riage existed. This was held to be error by the court of appeals, which
stated that the existence of the marriage was properly a question for the
jury. In giving this ruling, the court said, without citing authority, that
the existence of a marriage was an absolute defense to the crime of lar-
ceny or burglary. This is the common-law rule which was adopted by
Ohio in an early case."8 In contrast to this rule there are several recent
cases from other jurisdictions which have held that with the passage of the
Married Women's Property Acts the husband can be convicted of lar-
ceny or embezzlement where he intentionally steals his wife's separate
property, although clear proof is required that he had no authority to
deal with her property.3"
Etter v. Von Aschei 40 is a recent example of a judicial trend to view
with skepticism the claims of a party who professes to have been the com-
mon-law spouse of the deceased. In most cases the claim is made by a
woman; in the present case the claim was made by a man who daimed
that he was the deceased's widower. The court held that the claim of
the alleged widower was an action adverse to the administrator of the
deceased, and therefore that the "dead man statute"'" prevented him from
testifying as to the alleged common-law marriage. The court then ruled
that he had failed to establish his daim by clear and convincing evidence.
PARENT AND CHILD
At common law a child was not required to support his adult parent.
Any statute which attempts to change this rule is apt to bump into the
principle that statutes in derogation of the common law will be strictly
construed. This was the case in State v. Pizon. The statute provides that
35. 170 N.E.2d 307 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1960).
36. Oo REV. CODE § 2905.43.
37. 168 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
38. State v. Phillips, 85 Ohio St. 317, 97 N.E. 976 (1912).
39. The recent cases are dted in PERKINs, CMIWAL LAW 217 (1957).
40. 163 N.E.2d 197 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959).
41. Otno REV. CODE S 2317.03.
42. 168 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
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the parents, spouse and children of a patient in a state mental hospital are
liable for his support." The court held that the statute did not expressly
provide for either a joint or several liability. Since the primary liability
for support is placed on the spouse by other statutes, the court ruled that
the children of the patient could not be held liable where there was a
spouse living, even though that spouse was insolvent.
ADOPTION
During the period covered by this survey, there were two interesting
juvenile court opinions which are indicative of the factors considered in
adoption cases. In the first case,44 an unwed Roman Catholic mother
gave her child to a Jewish and Presbyterian couple, expressly indicating
that she did not care if the child was raised as a non-Catholic. On the
couple's petition for adoption, the court held that the Catholic Church
could intervene as amicus curiae, but that the Church had no legal right
to have the child raised as a Catholic. The controlling principle is the
welfare of the child, and religion is only one factor to be considered.
Incidentally, the court is to be commended for publishing the opinion
under a fictitious name ("Jane Doe") in order to protect the mother and
child. This practice is common in England and some of the eastern states
where a good many divorce and annulment cases involving sexual diffi-
culties are docketed and published as "Doe v. Doe" or "Anonymous v
Anonymous." There have been several Ohio cases which have indicated
that this cannot be done in the absence of a statute. It seems to the
author that the court in this case was correct in holding that a court has
inherent power to protect innocent parties who may be affected by the
decision, and that the public interest in protecting the child outweighs the
freedom of the press.
The second case, In re Douglas,45 is a good illustration of the con-
trolling factors in a decision to terminate the parental rights of the
natural parents for a continuous course of misconduct, thereby paving the
way for an adoption proceeding in which their consent can be dispensed
with.
HUGH A. Ross
43. OHIo REV. CODE § 5121.06.
44. In the Matter of Jane Doe, 167 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1956).
45. 164 N.E.2d 475 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1959).
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